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Abstract 
This paper considers the computational complexity of the disjunction and existential proper- 
ties of intuitionistic logic. We prove that the disjunction property holds feasibly for intuitionistic 
propositional logic; i.e., from a proof of A VB, a proof either of A or of B can be found in poly- 
nomial time. For intuitionistic predicate logic, we prove superexponential ower bounds for the 
disjunction property, namely, there is a superexponential lower bound on the time required, given 
a proof of A VB, to produce one of A and B which is true. In addition, there is superexponential 
lower bound on the size of terms which fulfill the existential property of intuitionistic predicate 
logic. There are superexponential upper bounds for these problems, so the lower bounds are 
essentially optimal. @ 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
AA4S clussijication: 03F05; 03F20; 03F20; 03F55; 03C40; 68Q15; 68Nl7 
Keywords: Cut-elimination; Craig interpolation; Polynomial-time: Horn resolution: 
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1. Introduction 
It is a well-known fact [l] that intuitionistic logic satisfies the following disjunction 
and existential properties: (throughout this paper, t represents intuitionistic provability.) 
l If k A V B, then t A or t B. 
l If t (3ix)A(x), then t A(t) for some term t. 
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We are interested in studying the problem of the complexity of the disjunction and 
existential properties. For instance, given that A V B is intuitionistically valid, how hard 
is it to identify one of A or B as intuitionistically valid? Or, given an intuitionistically 
valid formula (Zl~x)A(x), how hard is it to find a term t such that A(t) is intuitionistically 
valid? For the case of propositional logic, there is a PSPACE algorithm for the first 
problem, since propositional validity is decidable in polynomial space [3, 51. For the 
second problem, if the first-order language contains only predicate symbols and constant 
symbols, but no function symbols, then the term t can be taken to be either a constant 
symbol or a free variable of A(n) so there is a trivial constant upper bound on the size 
of the term t. However, if there is a non-unary function symbol in the language, then 
there is no recursive upper bound on the size of t (as a function of A). Likewise, in 
predicate logic with at least one non-unary function symbol, there is no recursive bound 
on the complexity of deciding the disjunction property (using the fact that there are 
r.e. sets which cannot be recursively separated). 3 From this last fact, one can see that 
in intuitionistic predicate logic, even with no function symbols, there is no recursive 
bound on the computational complexity of finding a term t that fulfills the existential 
property for a given valid formula (3x)A(x); similarly the disjunction property can be 
non-recursive in theories without function symbols. ’ 
The previous paragraph discussed complexity bounds in terms of the formulas A V B 
or (3x)&x). It is, however, more interesting to determine the computational complexity 
of solving the disjunction and existential properties assuming we are given a proof 
of A V B or of (3x)A, respectively; and these are the questions we will address in 
this paper. 
There are a variety of related questions here: for example, one could ask about (a) 
the complexity of determining a particular one of A or B to be valid, (b) bounds on 
the size of the shortest proof of either A or B, or (c) the computational complexity 
of producing a proof of either A or B; in each of the three cases assuming that a 
proof of A V B is given as input. In propositional logic, we show below that there is 
a polynomial time algorithm which produces a proof of either A or B from a proof of 
A V B. This also gives a polynomial time bound for the problem (a) and a polynomial 
3 Here is a quick sketch of the proof of these two assertions: let U(e, t,x) be a formula expressing the 
condition that Turing machine with GBdel number e halts within t steps outputting n E (0, 1). It is possible 
to formulate U(e, t,x) as a first-order formula so that t- U(e,t,z) holds whenever U is true of the values 
represented by c,l,x; here m denotes the term Y’O. Consideration of the formulas 3ElxL’(p, t,x) which 
are true illustrates the fact that t cannot be recursively bounded in terms of the size of 3tZ!_xU(g. t,x), 
since otherwise the halting problem would be decidable. To prove the non-recursiveness of the disjunction 
property, the set of formulas of the form 
(31)U(e, t 0) v (3t)U(c, f> 1) 
which are true shows that deciding on a valid disjunct cannot be a recursive process. 
4 If there are no function symbols, we can use relation symbols instead of function symbols and formulate 
U:(x) which asserts that Turing machine e eventually halts with output x E (0, 1). Then the sentences 
(b)U~(x) illustrate the non-recursiveness of the existential property, and the sentences U,*(O) V U:(l) 
illustrate the non-recursiveness of the disjunction property. 
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upper bound for the problem (b) for propositional intuitionistic logic. For predicate 
logic, we shall give a superexponential lower bound on the time required to recognize 
one of A or B as valid, even given a proof of A V B. This immediately implies also a 
superexponential lower bound on the size of a proof of either A or B and thereby a 
superexponential lower bound for the time required to produce such a proof. 
For the existential property, we give a superexponential lower bound on the size 
of a term t such that A(t) is intuitionistically valid; this superexponential bound is in 
terms of the size of a proof of (h)A(x). 
The above superexponential lower bounds are easily seen to be essentially optimal, 
since a proof-normalization procedure can be used to solve the disjunction and exis- 
tential properties. 
For the special case of predicate logic with no function symbols, we give an expo- 
nential upper bound on the computational complexity of the disjunction and existential 
properties. 
2. The propositional disjunction property 
We formalize intuitionistic propositional calculus as a natural deduction system with 
explicit listing of assumptions. In this system, we use a sequent A,,. . . A,, =+ B (n > 0) 
to denote the fact that the formula B has been derived from the assumptions A 1, . A,, . 
The assumptions Al,. . . ,A,, form a set. 
When we speak of a formula F being provable, we mean the sequent =+ F. 
The axioms of our intuitionistic propositional logic are A =+ A and I+ A, for A any 
formula. 
The inference rules are standard introduction and elimination rules for A. V. 
and > These are the inferences 
1-=sAAB l-+AAB I‘=+A A=+B 
1-=+A I-+-B r.il+AAB 
r+AVB A,A+C Ll,B+C r=+A l-+-A 
I-,A,Ll*C 1-+AVB I-+AvB 
The four rules in the lefthand side are called elimination rules and the rest are called 
introduction rules. A cut in a natural deduction proof consists of an introduction rule 
whose conclusion is the principal (i.e., leftmost) hypothesis of an elimination rule. It 
is well-known that natural deduction proofs can be normalized, so that the cuts can 
be removed from natural deduction proofs [4]. When cuts are permitted, the natural 
deduction system is equivalent to the sequent calculus and to Hilbert-style systems 
in that proofs in one system can be converted into a proof in another system by a 
polynomial time algorithm. 
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For the rest of this section, we assume that an intuitionistic natural deduction proof 
da of some formula is fixed. 
Definition. A sequent S of the form r + A is immediately derivable (i.d.) according 
to the following inductive definition: 
(a) S occurs in do, or 
(b) C, r + A and + C are both id., for some formula C. 
In other words, the i.d. sequents are obtained from sequents present in do by sequent 
calculus style cuts with id. formulas. 
Lemma 1. Every immediately derivable sequent is derivable. Furthermore, there is a 
polynomial time algorithm which, given do, gives derivations of all its i.d. sequents. 
Proof. It is obvious by the induction on the definition of id. sequents that every id. 
sequent is derivable. Furthermore, since the i.d. sequents are obtained only by sequent 
calculus style cuts from sequents in da, this is essentially the same as reasoning with 
Horn clauses using only SLD resolution, which is easily seen (and well-known) to be 
polynomially time complete. 0 
The following statement provides a simple polynomial time method of finding a 
provable disjunct from a given proof do. Note that no normal form property is assumed 
for do. 
Theorem 2. If do:+ A V B then at least one of A and B is i.d. 
As an immediate consequence of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, we have: 
Corollary 3. There is a polynomial time algorithm which, given a propositional intu- 
itionistic proof of A V B, produces a proof of either A or B. 
In order to prove Theorem 2 we shall use a restricted normalization process in which 
only certain cuts are eliminated. Recall that a cut (maximal formula) in a natural 
deduction is a conclusion of an introduction rule which is the principal formula of 
an elimination rule (i.e. it contains the connective to be eliminated). We call a cut 
assumption-free if its last sequent (the conclusion of the elimination rule) contains no 
assumption, i.e. is of the form + F. Let d I be the result of eliminating all assumption- 
free cuts from do by the standard cut-reduction steps (this process is recalled below 
in the proof of Lemma 5). The proof d 1 exists since every sequence of cut-reductions 
terminates. 
Lemma 4. If a proof d:+ F does not contain assumption-free cuts, then it ends in 
an introduction rule. 
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Proof. Suppose that the proof does not end in an introduction rule. Then, it must 
end with one of the four elimination rules shown above. The last sequent has no 
assumptions, and therefore the leftmost hypothesis of the introduction rule also has no 
assumptions. Continue traversing upwards in the proof tree for as long as we encounter 
elimination rules, always choosing the leftmost branch. The sequents we reach in this 
traversal all have no assumptions and eventually we must arrive either at an introduction 
inference or at an initial sequent. However, it is impossible to arrive at an initial 
sequent, since all initial sequents have assumptions. Likewise, it is impossible to arrive 
at an introduction rule, since this would be an assumption-free cut and d has no 
assumption free cuts. 
Therefore, we have obtained a contradiction, so d must end with an introduction 
rule. 3 
Lemma 4 implies that the final inference of dl is an V-introduction, and thus either 
+ A or + B is the penultimate sequent in d 1. To finish the proof of the Theorem 2 
it will suffice to show that every sequent in dl including the premise A or B of the 
concluding V-introduction is i.d. (with respect to the original proof do). This fact 
follows immediately from the next lemma. 
Lemma 5. I’d converts to d’ by a single reduction of an assumption-free cut. then 
ever)) sequent i.d. with respect to d’ is i.d. with respect to d. 
Proof. It is certainly sufficient to verify only that every sequent appearing in d’ is i.d. 
with respect to d, since the other clause of the definition of i.d. is obviously preserved. 
There are three cases to consider corresponding to possible reductions. 
In the case of A-reduction the proof is reduced according to: 
=+A +B reduces to d*i 
+Ar\B =+A 
=+A 
Thus no new sequents appear in d’ and the lemma holds trivially. 
In the case of >-reduction the proof is reduced according to: 
A=+A 
d* ‘.,; ,: =%A 
A+F reduces to d*’ ‘. i 
+A>F +A *F 
=+F 
where there may be multiple occurrences of the axiom A =s A in the subproof d”, and 
where d*’ is the same as d’ except with occurrences of A deleted from the assumptions 
of sequents. Since A was i.d. in d, each sequent in d’ is id. with respect to d. 
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In the final case of V-reduction the proof is reduced according to: 
A=+A *A 
*A d* ‘.. f .: reduces to d*’ ’ ‘. f . . ’ 
=+ AVB A+F B=+-F *F 
*F 
Again new sequents in d’ are obtained from sequents in d by deleting occurrences of 
i.d. formula A from assumptions. So each sequent in d’ is i.d. with respect to d. 0 
That completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
3. Upper bounds for predicate logic 
In the following we deal with the intuitionistic predicate logic with arbitrary pred- 
icate, constant and function symbols formalized as a natural deduction calculus. The 
axioms and rules of inference for the natural deduction proof system for intuitionistic 
predicate logic are those of the above defined propositional system plus elimination 
and introduction rules for quantifiers: 
r + (t’x)A(x) 
l- =+ A(t) 
l- =+ A(b) 
I- =+ (Yx)A(x) 
r + (3x)A(x) &A(b) + C T*A(t) 
r,A*C r * (3x)A(x) 
In these rules, the symbol b is a free variable, called the eigenvariuble of the inference: 
it is required that b not occur free in the conclusion of the inference. 
For predicate logic, we modify the definition of immediate derivability to allow 
substituting terms for (eigen)variables: Let a proof do be fixed. 
Definition. A sequent 5’ is immediately derivable (i.d.) according to the following 
inductive definition: 
(a) S occurs in do, or 
(b) S is of the form r + A and there is a formula C such that C, r + A and + C are 
both i.d. 
(c) S is of the form r(t) + A(t) where T(b) + A(b) is i.d. 
The next lemma is immediate from the definition of i.d. 
Lemma 6. Every immediately derivable sequent is derivable. 
Theorem 7. (a) If do is a proof of =+ A V B then at least one of A and B is i.d. 
(b) If do is a proof of (3x)A(x) then A(t) is i.d. for some term t. 
S. Buss, G. Mints1 Annals of’ Pure and Applied Logic 99 (1999) 93-104 99 
Proof. Theorem 7 is proved exactly like Theorem 2: we need only check the two 
additional reduction cases that now arise in the proof of Lemma 5. 
In the case of a V-reduction the proof is reduced according to: 
*A(b) reduces to d*’ ‘. ! ” 
=+ (Vx)A(x) =+ A(f) 
=+ A(t) 
The subproof d*’ is obtained from d” by replacing all relevant occurrences of the 
variable b with the term t. Thus every sequent in the reduced proof d’ is i.d. with 
respect to the original proof d. 
In the case of an 3reduction the proof is reduced according to: 
A(b) *A(b) 
+ A(t) 
==s A(t) d ..:’ *I’. : reduces to 
u’ _,:’ */‘. : 
=+ (3x)A(x) A(b)+F 
=SF 
=+F 
Again, every sequent in the reduced proof d’ is i.d. with respect to the original 
proof d. 0 
Theorem 7 provides a simple description of the set of i.d. formulas. An obvious upper 
bound on the number of id. formulas is the total number of sequents in the proof dl 
obtained by elimination of assumption-free cuts from the original natural deduction do. 
It is well-known that there is (only) a superexponential blowup in the size of proofs 
during the normalization procedure. This gives a superexponential upper bound on the 
time complexity of eliminating assumption-free cuts from proof do. Therefore, there 
is a superexponential time algorithm which, given a proof do, produces a set .Y’ of 
sequents such that every Cd. sequent is a substitution instance of one of the sequents 
in 9. We call Y a complete set of i.d. sequents. 
More precisely, define 2 fit by 2 $0 = 0 and 2 9 (n + 1) = 2’1”“. Then we have 
established the following upper bound. 
Theorem 8. There is an algorithm with runtime 2 3 (cn), for some constant c, brhich 
upon input a proqf of n symbols, produces proqj? of a complete set sf id. sequents 
for do. 
By Theorem 7, this superexponential time algorithm solves the disjunction and ex- 
istential properties. 
In the next section, we shall prove that this superexponential order of magnitude 
for the runtime is essentially optimal. However, in the special case of predicate logic 
with no function symbols, the terms t which are used in substituting into id. sequents 
according to the third case of the definition of i.d., may be required (w.1.o.g.) to be one 
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of the variables or constant symbols which appear in do. With this restriction on the 
terms t, there are only exponentially many possible i.d. formulas. Therefore, using the 
usual SLD resolution method for Horn clauses, there is an exponential time algorithm 
which produces a complete set of i.d. sequents for do. This establishes: 
Theorem 9. There is an exponential time algorithm which solves the disjunction and 
existential properties for intuitionistic predicate logic with no function symbols. 
4. The existential property lower bound 
This section will describe the superexponential ower bound for the existential prop- 
erty for intuitionistic predicate logic. The lower bound is established by exhibiting a 
family of sentences (3x)4(x) which have short, polynomial length proofs such that the 
formulas ,4(t) are valid only for superexponentially long terms t. 
By the previous two sections, any lower bound on the existential property must 
include also a lower bound on the number of steps in proof normalization; thus it is 
no surprise that our proof uses the ‘induction speed-up’ method of Solovay (which 
is similar to the much earlier construction which Gentzen used for the provability of 
transfinite induction) which happens also to be one of the best tools for proving lower 
bounds on proof normalization and on cut-elimination. The first uses of the induction 
speed-up method for proving such lower bounds were by Orevkov [4] and Statman [8]; 
see also the survey of Pudlak [6]. 
We will choose the predicate language containing the constant symbol 0, the unary 
function S, the infix binary function symbol + and two binary predicate symbols = 
and e. One can intuitively think of these symbols representing zero, successor, addition 
and equality and of e(x, y) representing the relation y = 2”. Define G to be the universal 
closure of the conjunction of the following formulas: 
x+0=x x=x 
0+x=x x=y>y=x 
x+Sy=S(x+y) x=yAy=z>x=z 
(x+y)+z=x+(y+z) x=y>Sx=Sy 
e(0, SO) x=yAu=v>(x+u)=(y+v) 
e(x, y) 3 e(Sx, Y + y) x = y A u = v A e(x, u) 3 e( y, v) 
The axioms in the righthand column are of course just the familiar equality axioms - 
we are assuming that our underlying predicate logic does not have the equality relation 
as a logical symbol, but only as a non-logical symbol. 
We define the following formulas J,,,(x) and K,(x) by induction on m: 
Jo(x) H 0=0 
K,(x) w (~Y)((G 1 e(x, y)) A J&)) 
J,,+I (~1 @ WKn(z) 3 Kn(z + ~1). 
S. Buss, G. Mints1 Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 99 (1999) 93-104 
It is easy to see that there are intuitionistic proofs of the following formulas: 
101 
Ko(O) 
W’x)(Ko(x) 2 KoW)> 
JI (0) 
W’X)(JI Cx> 3 JI (Sx)) 
JI (SO) 
W)(JIC~> 3 JIG + xl> 
Wy/x)(J~(x) ~Ko(x)) 
Continuing by induction on m, the same constructions show there are proof of the 
following formulas, and that furthermore these proofs have size polynomial in m. 
L(O) 
(‘vx)(L(x) 1 KGx)) 
Jm-1(0) 
We thus immediately get polynomial size (in m) proofs of 
(~x)GL-I (x) 1 (~Y)((G >e(x, v)) A G(x))) 
and iterating this m times, polynomial size proofs of 
With x = 0, we get thereby also polynomial size proofs of the sentences 
(3~,~).~.(3yl)[G>(e(O,yl)Ae(yl,y~)A~~~Ae(y~~-1,~~))1. (1) 
Now consider the complexity of the existential property for this last intuitionistically 
derivable sentence. If we consider the standard (classical) model of the integers with 
zero, successor, addition, true equality and exponentiation, we see that the only terms 
that can be substituted into equation ( 1) for the variable y, and yield a true formula 
are the terms with value 2 fim. Since the only function symbols at our disposal are 
successor and addition, any term with value 2 fi m must have at least 2 9 (m - 1) 
symbols. On the other hand, Eq. (1) has an intuitionistic proof of n = mot ’ ) symbols. 
Thus we have established that the existential property for intuitionistic predicate logic 
has superexponential (i.e., stack of twos of height n”) complexity. 5 
5 Our construction did not minimize the number of non-logical symbols in the language. With a more 
complicated version of the same proof, we could use a language with only a binary fimction symbol. As 
we remarked in Section 3, the existential property for a first-order language with no function symbols has 
at worst exponential-time computational complexity 
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5. The disjunction property lower hound 
In this section, the superexponential lower bound for the existential property is 
extended to a similar superexponential ower bound for the disjunction property. For the 
lower bound for the disjunction property, we cannot use just superexponential growth 
rate. Instead, we will use a Turing machine for which it is difficult to predict what state 
it will be in a future point in time. We shall pick a fixed Turing machine A4 which has 
a single, two-way infinite tape and has only the two alphabet symbols a and b. The 
machine A4 will have the property that the problem of, given m, determining which 
state A4 will be in after computing for exactly 2 $ m steps starting on a blank tape (b is 
the blank symbol) is not in the complexity class TIME(2 h (m - c)) for some constant 
c. Such a Turing machine can easily be shown to exist using the Hartmanis-Steams 
time hierarchy theorem. 
For convenience sake, we use a larger language for predicate logic, which, in addition 
to the symbols =, 0, S, + and e, contains constants a and b for the tape symbols of 
M, constants 41, . . , q,F which represent the s states of M, a 4-ary predicate symbol ID, 
a binary function symbol 0, and a unary predicate symbol Dfnt. The intuitive idea of CT 
is that terms of the form ~(ci, (T(CZ, r~(c3,. . . ))) represent strings ~1~2~3 . where each 
ci is either a or b. Then the predicate ID(t, q, LX, /I) is intended to mean that at time step 
t, A4 is in state q, with the string /3 to the right of the tape head, and with the string 
CI to the left of the tape head. It is convenient to reverse the symbol order to the left 
of the tape head, so that in fact CI represents the string obtained by starting with the 
symbol under the tape head and then moving leftward. ‘ID’ stands for ‘instantaneous 
description’. The intuitive idea for D@(x) is that x is the value of a term built up 
from a’s, b’s and CJ’S in some ‘definite’ or ‘decidable’ way. 
The set G” is defined to the conjunction of the universal closures of the following 
set of formulas: 
(a) Every formula in G is included in G*, in addition, the equality axioms for ID, CT 
and Dfnt are included. 
(b) b = a(b, b). Intuitively, this accounts for the fact that the tape is filled with blanks 
(b’s) everywhere past the ends of the half-tapes. 
(c) ZD(O,ql, b, b). Intuitively, the machine A4 starts on a blank tape. 
(d) For each transition rule (q!,c, q;,d) of M, where c,d E {a, b}, G* includes 
Intuitively: if in state qi, reading c, then write d and go to state qj. 
(e) For each transition rule (qi,c,qj,L) of M, where c E {a, b} and ‘L’ denotes ‘move 
left’, G* includes 
Intuitively: if in state q;, reading c, then move left one square and go to state qi. 
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(f) For each transition rule (q;, c, qi, R) of M, where c E {a. b} and ‘R’ denotes ‘move 
right’, and for each d E {a,b}, G* includes 
ID(x, 4,. a(c, u), a(d, c)) ---f ID(Sx, q,. a(d, (T(c, u)), P). 
Intuitively: if in state q,, reading c, then move right one square and go to state 4,. 
(g) G’ includes the formulas Djzt(b) and 
Qfnt(x) - @u)(Qfnt(u) A (X = o(a. U) v X = a(b, U))). 
We let qQ$zt(.u) abbreviate the formula 
Next we define analogues J,;(x) and K,:(x) of the formulas J,,(X) and K,,(X) from 
the previous section. However, instead of starting the inductive definition with J,;(.Y), 
the base definition is 
K:,(x) H (3q)@)@v)[G 3 (ID(x,q, u, 2:) A qQfnt(q) A Djzt(u) A Dfnt(c))]. 
It is easy to give intuitionistic proofs of 
K”,(O) and (~x)(Kr,(x)>K”,(Sx)). 
Then, by induction on m 3 - 1, we define 
J,Z+, @ (~z)(K&) ~K,,(z +x)) 
KS ,,,+, ++ (31‘)((G>e(x,y))AJ,,,+1(3’)) 
By arguments very similar to the ones given before, there are intuitionistic proofs of 
the following formulas 
K,;(O) 
(~~)(K,X~) 2 CPx)) 
J,;.+,(o) 
WW,A+,(-~1 >J,:+,W)) 
J,;l+, (SOI 
(~,~)(J,~~,,(.\:)>J,t+,(x x1> 
WM-k,(x) 1 K,:(x)) 
and the proofs of the above formulas are all polynomial size in m. We thus immediately 
get polynomial size proofs of 
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and iterating this m times, a polynomial size proof of 
(VX)(~Y,). . (3~1 )Kl~y~l) A [G 3 (~X,YI > A e(yl,Y2) A.. A ~Y~-I,Y,~))II. 
By the definition of KT, , this gives a proof of 
(vx)(3q)(3u)(3o)(3y,). . FYI )[G 1 (Wym,q> ~9 0) A @fWs> A 
e(x,vl)r\e(yl,y2)A...Ae(y,-l,y,))l. (2) 
Let &i be the sentence (note that x and q have been replaced by 0 and qi) 
(3U)(30)(3Yrn). . . VYl > 
[G 3 (Wy,,qi~u,~) A ~O,YI> A 4yl,y2) A ... A 4ym-1,ym))1. 
Then, from Eq. (2) and the definition of qDfnt, there is a polynomial size proof of 
(3) 
i=l 
Considering again the standard, classical model with domain the set of integers and 
with the non-logical symbols having their intended interpretations, it is clear that &; 
is a true sentence if and only if Turing machine A4 is in state qi at time 2 fi m. Since 
Eq. (3) has an intuitionistic proof of size n = m’(I), and by the choice of M, we have 
proved the desired superexponential lower bound on the complexity of deciding the 
disjunction property. 
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